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Abstract EU law on judicial protection before Member State courts plays an essential 
role as to the practical significance of EU law. This article studies the so-called 
procedural autonomy case law of the Court of Justice of the EU by examining 
formulations of rulings, focusing on requirements for national remedial and 
procedural law and for national judgments. Judicial protection and related Member 
State obligations are manifold issues. In addition to the conundrum relating to the 
principle of, and right to, efficient judicial protection and their relationship to 
‘Member State procedural autonomy’ principles of effectiveness and equivalence, 
nuances are visible in the conclusions of procedural autonomy reasoning itself. 
Aiming for effective application of EU law appears to lead to full effect-focused 
demands for national treatment so that interventions by the Court of Justice cannot be 
fully explained by the basic wording of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence. The requirement of ‘adequate judicial protection’, which at times seems 
to be a facet of the principle of effectiveness in particular but which may also ‘extend’ 
the twin principles, complexifies EU law on national enforcement. This study 
illustrates how the reasoning of the Court of Justice may contain varying meanings 
regardless of taking superficially similar basic requirements as starting points. 
Instances where more stringent demands on national systems are relevant, as well as 
the detailed effects, are difficult to discern. This results in lack of clarity as to how 
national courts should treat future cases and, for parties bringing claims, as to what 
kind of results to expect. The contribution ends with suggestions for clarifying EU 
law requirements. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most striking aspects of ‘EU procedural law’ is the role of Member State 
courts and national procedural and remedial rules. A vast amount of EU law1 exists 
‘on EU law in Member States’. Here, the focus is on the interaction of EU law with 
national remedial and procedural law, and on the EU requirements for decisions by 
national courts. The theme of judicial protection with a view to national remedies and 
procedures is of broad practical relevance, even though part of the discussion in this 
contribution focuses especially on the context of damages claims relating to different 
fields of EU law (such as competition, free movement and employment). The issues 
of remedies and procedure are intertwined and may actualise in horizontal 
relationships between individuals as well as in vertical relationships between 
individuals and Member States. Both ‘public’ and ‘private law’ matters with a EU law 
aspect may be instances where EU requirements for national enforcement systems are 
of relevance.  
 
The so-called procedural autonomy case law and loyal or sincere cooperation-based 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence are often among the first mentioned when 
the discussion concerns relying on EU law or reacting to infringements of EU law in 
national courts. In addition to containing substantive and concrete rules, EU law, 
which needs to rely on national systems for enforcement, sets limits of acceptability 
for national law that intertwines with EU law. Case law by the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU) on the express limits of acceptability, the twin principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence, has since the starting point in Rewe2 developed into a massive bulk 
which both interprets the principles and, to some extent, encourages balancing them 
against other factors and legal concerns. 
 
Other law on EU law infringements before national courts includes the general 
principle of effective judicial protection3 and the right to an effective remedy and to a 																																																								
1 The term ‘EU law’ is used in this text to refer to EU and Community law.	
2 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG [1976] ECR 01989. The first version of the 
procedural autonomy dictum, in para. 5, reads: ‘Applying the principle of cooperation laid down in 
Article 5 of the [EEC] Treaty, it is the national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal 
protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions of Community law. 
Accordingly, in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of 
each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have 
from the direct effect of Community law, – – such conditions cannot be less favourable than those 
relating to similar actions of a domestic nature [principle of equivalence]. – – [T]he right conferred by 
Community law must be exercised before the national courts in accordance with the conditions laid 
down by national rules. The position would be different only if the conditions and time-limits made it 
impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts are obliged to protect [principle 
of effectiveness, an early form].’ Notes in square brackets added by this author.	
3 Originally referred to as a principle which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and which is laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In EU law, the judicial protection approach 
was already in the early stages coupled with the Member State obligation to contribute to the full 
effectiveness of EU law. See Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 01651, para. 18, 53.	
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fair trial in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR). The relationship between the twin principles (effectiveness and equivalence) 
and the right and principle of effective judicial protection may be described as blurry. 
A further aspect of the theme is the duty of Member States to offer sufficient judicial 
remedies (Article 19(1) Treaty on European Union, TEU).4 As regards the various 
legal bases relating to judicial protection, a rough description could be that they are all 
aspects of a whole which requires that appropriate judicial protection may be obtained 
and which requires national systems to ensure that relying on EU law may be 
effectively achieved in national courts so that sufficiently powerful reactions to EU 
law infringements are possible. Following this line of thought, details of the whole are 
also expressed by the requirements on sanctions for EU law infringements, the full 
effectiveness of EU law being an underpinning goal.5 
 
The principle of effective judicial protection – and, post-Lisbon, increasingly also the 
corresponding right – seems to occupy an overarching role and to precede EU 
procedural autonomy law. However, the situation is anything but clear.6 Works by EU 
law scholars have discussed the relationship between the (Rewe) principle of 
effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection, or the corresponding 
right.7 Here, not all issues pertaining to the legal and theoretical structure of effective 
judicial protection in national courts may be examined at length. However, as a 
background to this research it should be noted that the principle of (and right to) 
effective judicial protection may be described as truly interested in judicial protection 
in a ‘Rechtsstaat’ way, whereas the principles of  effectiveness and equivalence 
appear to be mainly motivated by effective application of EU law.8 
 																																																								
4 See also, as to different effective judicial protection elements and their combination, for instance, 
Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-02271, para. 36–44 and 54; Case C-327/02 Panayotova [2004] 
ECR I-11055, para. 26–28, 39; Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-536/11 Donau 
Chemie [2013], electronic reports, in particular, para. 45, 51–53.	
5 Sanctions must be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ See, for example, C-186/98 Nunes and de 
Matos [1999] ECR I-04883, para. 9–10. See also Case 14/83 Von Colson [1984] ECR 01891, operative 
part. Requirements as to sanctions are also based on the principle and the Article on sincere 
cooperation. See also, for instance, M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014), p. 129.	
6 In addition to the case law in note 4, see, for example, Case C-268/06 Impact [2008], ECR I-02483, 
para. 40–55; Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] I-08015, para. 53–58 (emphasising supremacy and 
full effectiveness of EU law). On the ambiguous relationships between different judicial protection 
elements, see P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘The Confusing Constitutional Status of Positive Procedural 
Obligations in EU Law, Observations on effective judicial protection and national procedural 
autonomy in the wake of Boxus’, 5 Review of European Administrative Law (REALaw) 1, p. 81–100, 
in particular p. 81–82, 88–100 (2012). See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the 
Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’, 4 REALaw 2, p. 31–50 
(2011). In addition, see J. Engström, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection after the Lisbon 
Treaty – reflection in the light of Case C-279/09 DEB’ 4 REALaw 2, p. 53–68 (2011); A. Arnull, ‘The 
Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ 36 European Law Review 1, 
p. 51–70 (2011).	
7 S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2 (2011); P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 5 REALaw 1, p. 88–
100 (2012). Note also, for example, R. Barents, ‘EU Procedural Law and Effective Legal Protection’, 
51 Common Market Law Review (CMLR), p. 1437–1462, at 1437–1438 and 1454–1456 (2014).	
8 See, in particular, S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 39–50 with references (2011).	
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In this article, the aim is a closer look at the nuances and effects of procedural 
autonomy reasoning9. Through close examination of CJEU case law on relying on EU 
law and the duties of national systems in that context, this contribution seeks to 
illustrate how different standards and goals may lie behind the rather monotonous 
language of the CJEU, so that evaluating the correct treatment of a pending claim 
before a national court may be close to guesswork. Research of this nature is a step 
towards a better understanding of how EU law related claims should (or will) be 
treated by national courts. This contribution mostly assessses the issue of what should 
be noted when analysing the relevant EU law. This article also seeks to contribute to 
revealing points where a risk exists that national courts do not know, or may 
misunderstand, what EU law requires – or where the expectations of the parties may 
be misled because of the language used by the CJEU in its earlier guidance. 
Furthermore, suggestions are presented for developing CJEU guidance – even though 
it is also evident that vagueness of reasoning allows re-directing law in new 
preliminary rulings more easily than is the case with the detailed, somewhat inflexible 
explanations in earlier judgments. 
 
This article emphasises that there is more to effective application of EU law-oriented 
procedural autonomy law than the core contents of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence – that there seems to be a more ambiguous element that may accompany 
the twin principles, and that this element is prone to create confusion. A requirement 
of ‘adequate judicial protection’ or a similar phenomenon, which is a matter of the 
same context as the twin principles but may exceed the minimum requirements set by 
them, has already previously been noted by legal scholars.10 The requirement of 
‘adequate judicial protection’, as it is called also in this contribution, even though the 
name is rough and partially misleading (hence the quotation marks), appears to be 
purpose-oriented and used by the CJEU in reasoning that emphasizes the full 
effectiveness11 of EU law.12 Several commentators have pointed out that the CJEU 
seems at times to interfere in matters of national remedies and procedures more 
willingly or strongly where core issues of the Internal Market are involved13 or when 																																																								
9 That is, the use and implications of the procedural autonomy dictum (or ‘Rewe mantra’, see, for 
example, S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 31 (2011),) or parts of it.	
10 See, in particular, W. Van Gerven, ’Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLR 3, p. 501–536, 
for instance, 503–504, 511–512, 528 (2000). See also G. Cumming et al., Civil Procedure Used for 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the English, French and German Civil Courts, p. 280 (Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer 2007). See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 49–50, 39 (the 
authors note that effective application-driven ‘Rewe-effectiveness’ could develop into an additional and 
more stringent standard) (2011); P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Transforming Shields into Swords: The 
VEBIC Judgment, Adequate Judicial Protection Standards and the Emergence of Procedural 
Heteronomy in EU Law’, 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (MJ) 4, p. 511–547 
(2011).	
11 Or full effect, effet utile.	
12 See also Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-01029, para. 82. 
Van Gerven refers to the case as an adequate judicial protection case: W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 
511–512, 528 (2000).	
13 Remarks include suggesting links between the nature of law as requiring uniformity across the 
Union, (systematic) EU harmonisation and the CJEU intervention. See, in particular, M. Dougan, 
National Remedies Before the Court of Justice , Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Oxford 
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the case deals with EU law essential from the perspective of Union goals.14 These 
remarks may be considered in parallel with recognition of the ‘adequate judicial 
protection’ element. 
 
Prima facie, it is challenging to try to point out when exactly the strong requirement 
of ‘adequate judicial protection’ would be relevant. It is not coherently referred to 
either in CJEU case law or by commentators15 but its connection to the principle of 
sincere co-operation (currently Article 4(3) TEU, previously 10 EC, 5 EEC), which 
underlines Member State duties in contributing to achieving Union goals, appears to 
be strong.16 The requirement may be highly teleological and even signify that of the 
possible ways of treating an EU law-based claim, the way which most contributes to 
achieving the goals of the EU should be selected. This means that even though the 
requirement is connected to the principle of effective judicial protection and Article 
47 of the CFR, it is not necessarily exhausted by their ‘approach’.17  
 
It is here that the paradoxical nature of the (name of the) requirement may also be 
stressed. The focus is not entirely on the individual who brings a claim to a national 
court but on the effect that EU law may gain through that claim or the possibility of 
that claim. To some extent, the paradoxical nature matches the history of Union or 
Community rights of individuals.18 																																																																																																																																																														
and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 67–68, 83–84, 120–152, 356–359, 386–387. See also A. 
Adinolfi, ‘The ”Procedural Autonomy” of Member States and the Constraints Stemming from the 
ECJ’s Case Law: is Judicial Activism Still Necessary?’, in H.-W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds.), The 
European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, p. 281–303, at 299–301 
(Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland: Intersentia, 2012).	
14 See, for instance, P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, p. 222–223, 230–
231 (Fifth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), and the fourth edition of the same volume, 
p. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); D.-U. Galetta, Procedural Autonomy of EU Member 
States: Paradise Lost? A Study on the ‘Functionalized Procedural Competence’ of EU Member States, 
p. 19–21 (Corrected printing, Heidelberg – Dordrecht – London – New York: Springer, 2011). See also 
S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, p. 173–175 (Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). See further K. Havu, Oikeus kilpailuoikeudelliseen vahingonkorvaukseen EU:n ja Suomen 
oikeudessa, p. 252–257 (Helsinki: Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, 2013). See also on legislative and 
other developments regarding collective redress S. Voet, ’European Collective Redress: A Status 
Quaestionis’, 4 International Journal of Procedural Law 1, p. 97–128 (2014).	
15 As to the difficulty of recognizing the requirement in case law, see W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 
528–531 (2000). See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 49 and 39 (2011); M. 
Bobek, ‘Why There is no Principle of ‘Procedural Autonomy’ of the Member States’, in H.-W. Micklitz 
and B. de Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, p. 305–
323 (Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland: Intersentia, 2012).	
16 See also, for example, Case 14/83 Von Colson (para. 26–28), and Case C-271/91 Marshall II [1993], 
ECR I-04367, which W. Van Gerven (37 CMLR 3 (2000)) recognizes as adequate judicial protection 
cases. See also Sections III.A−III.C below.	
17 See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 39–50 (2011), who note the differing 
goals of different judicial protection elements of EU law and discuss the possibility that the (Rewe) 
principle of effectiveness may develop further in order to guarantee effective application of EU law. 
Note also R. Barents, 51 CMLR, p. 1456 (2014); K. Havu, ‘Private Enforcement of EU (Competition) 
Law – Remarks and Outlooks Regarding the Intertwinement of EU and National Law’, 150 Tidskrift 
utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland (JFT) 1–2, p. 55–72, 58–60 (2014).	
18 Extensive review is not possible here, but see Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 00003 
(noting that ‘the vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective 
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Next, starting points for analysing nuances of procedural autonomy reasoning, 
growing demands for national systems and ‘adequate judicial protection’ element are 
presented (Section II). After this, CJEU case law of  potential particular interest is 
studied with the aim of observing what exactly is required as to treatment of EU law 
based claims, with what rationale, and how this is expressed. Even though a brief 
review of pointillist case law has its limits as regards deductions, a series of remarks 
is presented on the use of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, ‘adequate 
judicial protection’ element and exceeding the ‘minimum content’ of the twin 
principles, especially when it comes to compensation for infringements of EU law 
(Section III).  
 
II. STARTING POINTS FOR ANALYSIS 
The ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement may be described as a facet, an 
expression or element of the procedural autonomy principles, especially of 
effectiveness. However, it may potentially set requirements additional to those set by 
the core contents of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The strong 
requirement is apparently blurry. 
 
In his work, Van Gerven connected the requirement of ‘adequate judicial protection’ 
to remedies (before a national court) and, in particular, to sufficiency and extent of 
redress. This is worth mentioning even though the borders between rights, remedies 
and procedural rules are intricate issues.19  
 
Difficulties as to studying the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement relate to the 
fact that the CJEU does not necessarily expressly mention or discuss the sub-parts of 
procedural autonomy requirements and their relationship to other aspects of EU law 
in national systems. It is conceivable that the relevance and implications of the 
‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement in new cases are ambiguous. National 
courts must, in addition to other issues that relate to recognizing and applying relevant 
EU law, tackle the absence of clarity as to applicable limits of acceptability of 
national law. Hence, it is possible that a ‘too little EU law-favourable’ decision is 
adopted if the national court only recognizes the relevance of the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence and their core contents (stating that it is not acceptable 																																																																																																																																																														
supervision’), and, for example, T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Relationship between Rights and Remedies in 
EC Law: in Search of the Missing Link’, 41 CMLR 5, p. 1199–1246 (2004); M. Ruffert, ‘Rights and 
Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’, 34 CMLR 2, p. 307–336 (1997). See 
also S. El Boudouhi, ‘The National Judge as an Ordinary Judge of International Law? Invocability of 
Treaty Law in National Courts’, 28 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 283–301, at 283–287 
(2015).	
19 See further W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, for instance, p. 503–504, 506–521, 526–528 (2000), and, 
in particular, T. Eilmansberger, 41 CMLR 5 (2004). See also K. Havu 150 JFT 1–2, p. 57–63 (2014); 
K. Havu, Oikeus kilpailuoikeudelliseen vahingonkorvaukseen EU:n ja Suomen oikeudessa, p. 223–305. 
On adequate judicial protection and procedural matters, see P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 18 MJ 4 (2011).  	
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to render relying on EU law or rights practically impossible or excessively difficult or 
to treat an EU law-based claim less favourably than a similar claim based on domestic 
law).20  
 
One could argue that, if in doubt, national courts should choose a more EU law-
favourable approach over a less EU law-favourable approach, but this is also by no 
means unproblematic. The principles concerning the effects of EU law in Member 
States are powerful tools capable of resulting in special interpretations of national 
provisions, disapplying (setting aside) components of national law and rendering 
‘novel’ EU law(-compatible) rules applicable to a case before a national court. These 
effects should not be realized without a basis in law. However, if the national court’s 
understanding of the EU law requirements exceeds the ‘correctly interpreted EU law 
requirements’ the result may be a decision that is not completely based on law.21 
 
III. REQUIREMENT FOR ‘ADEQUATE JUDICIAL PROTECTION’ IN EU 
CASE LAW 
A. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
Cases that could demonstrate the existence and nature of the ‘adequate judicial 
protection’ requirement are now explored. One of the logical starting points for 
highlights are the cases mentioned by Van Gerven when formulating the requirement, 
as well as cases referred to by scholars who point to connections betweeen essential 
(Internal Market or economic) EU law, requirements for judicial protection, and the 
CJEU’s willingness to intervene in matters of national remedies and procedure.22 
Space does not allow an extensive review of case law. The focus is intended to be on 
the most striking aspects of procedural autonomy-type reasoning. 
 
In order to discuss the nuances of the procedural autonomy reasoning, it is crucial to 
analyse the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement in relation to the explicit 																																																								
20 See also K. Havu 150 JFT 1–2, p. 58–63 (2014). On issues of recognizing and complying with 
relevant EU law, see also, for example, B. Krans, ‘EU Law and National Civil Procedure Law: An 
Invisible Pillar’, 23 European Review of Private Law 4, p. 567–588, 567–572, 581–587 (2015). 	
21 In order to illustrate the conundrum of how much EU law requires: A Finnish district court had to 
decide on damages liability succession in the context of an asphalt cartel that had infringed both EU 
and domestic competition law. The Court pointed out that under Finnish law, liability for damages 
relating to competition law infringements would not transfer to a company which acquires an 
undertaking that is guilty of breaching competition law. The Court found this problematic from the 
point of view of ‘the system of legal consequences of EU competition law infringements’ and 
reasoned, referring to, i. a., EU case law on liability for competition law fines, that it was necessary to 
find that private liability had transferred to companies that had acquired business activities in the 
context of which competition infringements had taken place. The mere principle of effectiveness does 
not clearly require this conclusion, nor does an applicable, exact rule of EU law exist. It is questionable 
whether EU and national law are combined correctly in situations like these. See Helsinki District 
Court, judgment 28.11.2013, L 09/49467, and K. Havu 150 JFT 1–2, p. 66–72 (2014).	
22 See Introduction and notes 13 and 14 above.	
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procedural autonomy principles. It is evident that the idea behind the original 
recognition of the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement must have been that the 
case law of the CJEU contains interventions in issues of national remedies (and 
procedure) that may not be explained solely by relying on the the minimalistic basic 
forms of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence even though the interventions 
would take place ‘within procedural autonomy reasoning’23. Nowadays, the CJEU in 
its judgments uses procedural autonomy dicta that often include both a description of 
the main contents of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence and their names: 
 
it is for the national legal system of each Member State to 
designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, 
provided that such rules are not less favourable than those 
governing similar national actions (principle of equivalence) and 
that they do not render practically impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of 
effectiveness).24 
 
Of course, interpretation of the twin principles and their detailed significance in all 
kinds of specific circumstances has been the subject of numerous preliminary 
rulings.25 But what is meant by the principles in the procedural autonomy dicta, and 
what the core significance or core content of the twin principles should be regarded to 
be, is reasonably clear. 
 
The principle of effectiveness (national rules must not render relying on EU law 
practically impossible or excessively difficult) developed into its current formulation 
from the prohibition against ‘practical26 impossibility’.27 In particular, the 
‘excessively difficult’ (in French ‘excessivement difficile’) part of the core contents of 
the principle could be seen as such a limit of acceptability the significance of which 
																																																								
23 But as to explicit reliance by the CJEU on procedural autonomy argumentation being potentially 
misleading, see P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 5 REALaw 1, p. 90–93 (2012). 	
24 Joined Cases C-89/10 and C-96/10 Q-Beef and others [2011] ECR I-07819, para. 32. See also, for 
instance, Case C-268/06 Impact, para. 46; Case C-432/05 Unibet, para. 43.	
25 See further, for instance, T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, p. 418–476 (Second 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of 
Justice , p. 24–38. 	
26 Or ‘virtual’, see for example Case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 03595.	
27 See, for instance, Case 68/79 Just [1980] ECR 00501, para. 18, which still mentions mere practical 
impossibility. Compare to Case 199/82 San Giorgio, para. 12–14. Para. 12 also includes references to 
earlier case law which only mentions practical impossibility. See similarly K. Havu, Oikeus 
kilpailuoikeudelliseen vahingonkorvaukseen EU:n ja Suomen oikeudessa, p. 257–258. See also M. 
Bobek, in H.-W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of 
the Member States, p. 306; P. Craig – G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, p. 219 (2011); 
A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law, p. 87–101 (Second edition, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).	
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could vary slightly depending on the circumstances of the case. One might also 
consider whether some language versions suggest this more than others.28  
 
Nevertheless, the current long formulation of the core contents of the principle of 
effectiveness somewhat clearly refers to the impossibility or considerable difficulty of 
effectively relying on EU law. This and procedural autonomy case law more generally 
give rise to three rough remarks: Firstly, not everything that comes in addition to the 
prohibition of practical impossibility is outside of the (core) meaning of the principle 
of effectiveness. Secondly, however, it appears that some of the known conclusions 
drawn from the principle of effectiveness in the case law of the CJEU may not be 
necessiated by the principle, at least if one interprets its core contents narrowly.29 
Thirdly, description of  ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement as an element or 
expression of, in particular, principle of effectiveness may be supported by the fact 
that it seems like there is no clear ‘border’ between different levels of requirements or 
that the requirements, to an extent, overlap.30 The ‘adequate judicial protection’ 
requirement may, nevertheless, sometimes be observed as significantly ‘extended 
application’ of, for instance, the principle of effectiveness. This is discussed further in 
Sections III.D−III.F. 
 
As to the principle of equivalence, its core contents refer to a prohibition against less 
favourable treatment of an EU law-based claim when compared to similar claims 
made on the basis of national law. The CJEU has given guidance on the application of 
the principle stating that national courts have to ‘consider both the purpose and the 
essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions’.31 Notably, the core 
content of the principle of equivalence has not been understood as suggesting that 
when compared to several national options that can all be regarded as similar, only the 
most favourable of these would be acceptable as a way to treat an EU law-based 																																																								
28 English, French and Spanish (‘excesivamente difícil’) or German (‘übermässig erschwert’) perhaps 
do not suggest this indisputably whereas, for instance, the (less important) Swedish (‘orimligt svårt’) 
and Finnish (‘suhteettoman vaikeaksi’) may hint at a more relative approach. See, for example, Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 67. The authentic languages of the joined 
cases are English and German.	
29 Examples of the case law are discussed in the following Sections. As to literature, for example M. 
Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice , p. 258, notes: ’the Court has sent out 
confusing signals about what the principle of effectiveness requires as regards the level of 
compensation which must be guaranteed under national law’. See also J. Temple Lang, ’Developments, 
Issues, and New Remedies – The Duties of National Authorities and Courts Under Article 10 of the EC 
Treaty’, 27 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 1904–1939, at 1908–1910 and 1938 (2003–2004). 
The author highlights the in practice comprehensive nature of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence. See also M. Bobek, in H.-W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds.), The European Court of 
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, p. 307, 311–312, 316–318, 322–323. 	
30 See also P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 18 MJ 4, p. 538 (2011); P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, 
Cases and Materials, p. 218–219 and 220–227 (2011). Note that also W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3 
(2000), in particular, p. 503–504, 527–528, considers that ‘adequate judicial protection’ exceeds the 
twin principles when the principle of effectiveness is understood according to the longer formulation, 
but does not structure the relationships between the twin principles and adequate judicial protection in 
detail.	
31 For example, Case C-78/98 Preston [2000] ECR I-03201, para. 49, 55–61.	
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claim32 or that an EU law-based claim should be treated better than claims based on 
domestic law. The ‘adequate judicial protection’ element and stronger demands 
related to it could, however, produce results like these. 
 
One could ask, more generally, whether the recurring formulation of the procedural 
autonomy dictum precludes the possibility of requirements exceeding the (core 
contents of) effectiveness and equivalence. However, this is not the case as the dictum 
does not suggest it would be exhaustive as to requirements for national systems.33 
Moreover, as will be discussed in the following Sections, extension of the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence as a form of increasing the requirements for national 
systems results, at points, in the prima facie nonexistence of extra requirements. 
 
To some extent the twin principles, the element of ‘adequate judicial protection’ and 
the right to and the principle of effective judicial protection, require the same and 
similar things from national systems. One interpretation of the situation could be that 
the general right to effective judicial protection is (partially) made more specific, for 
instance, by the principle of effectiveness and its different aspects. Further 
specifications may shed light on the balance of EU law interests behind the 
requirements for national enforcement. In the case law, however, different procedural 
and remedial matters may present themselves as very much intertwined.34 
 
B. FIRST SIGNS OF ‘ADEQUATE JUDICIAL PROTECTION’? 
In Von Colson35, Marshall II36 and Brasserie du Pêcheur37 the CJEU explicitly 
referred to adequacy or commensurability of compensation for damages caused by a 
breach of EU law. Van Gerven, who based recognition of the ‘adequate judicial 
protection’ requirement on these cases, highlights Von Colson paragraph 28, in which 
the Court articulates that compensation must be ‘adequate in relation to the damage 
sustained and must therefore amount to more than purely nominal compensation’.38 
Van Gerven points out that in Marshall II the CJEU required the ‘measure’ to be 
‘adequate’ and that it ‘must enable the loss and damage actually sustained – – to be 
																																																								
32 For example, Case C-326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-07835, para 42.	
33 See the quote above in this Section and note 24. See also on the secondary nature of the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence (relating to the precondition of ‘in the absence of EU law on the matter’) 
P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 5 REALaw 1, p. 91–100 (2012).	
34 See also remarks and references on this matter in the Introduction.	
35 Case 14/83 Von Colson. See also W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 528–531 (2000).	
36 Case C-271/91 Marshall II [1993] ECR I-04367. See also W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 528–531 
(2000).	
37 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur. See also W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 
528–531 (2000).	
38 Case 14/83 Von Colson, para. 28 (in the authentic language of the case, German, the relevant part 
reads: ‘in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zu dem erlittenen Schaden stehen und somit über einen rein 
symbolischen Schadensersatz wie etwa die blosse Erstattung der Bewerbungskosten hinausgehen’); W. 
Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, see, in particular, p. 528 (2000). See also p. 530.	
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made good in full’.39 As to Brasserie du Pêcheur, Van Gerven emphasises paragraph 
82, where the CJEU states, in addition to mentioning the core contents of the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence (paragraphs 67–83): ‘Reparation for loss 
or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law must be 
commensurate with the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure the effective 
protection for their rights.’40 
 
Van Gerven also makes the general remark that the requirement of ‘adequate judicial 
protection’ is visible in some cases that deal with damages claims but that the case 
law appears to be incoherent and, for instance, restitution cases seem to turn on the 
mere (core contents of) principles of effectiveness and equivalence instead of a higher 
standard.41 Nevertheless, Van Gerven considers wider adoption of the ‘adequacy test’ 
justified, hinting that a test turning on ‘practical’ or ‘virtual impossibility’ and 
‘excessive difficulty’ is a perverse starting point from the perspective of enforcement 
of Community rights. A more reasonable way to look at the issue would be to ask 
whether enforcement is sufficient or powerful enough.42 
 
On the basis of the damages cases above, it is likely that the requirement of ‘adequate 
judicial protection’ is partially truly inspired by the aim of sufficiently protecting the 
interests of individuals in cases of breaches of EU law. However, judgments also 
contain reasoning that emphasises the need to secure the full effectiveness of EU law. 
For instance, in Brasserie du Pêcheur, full effectiveness of Community law is 
mentioned several times and the duty of Member States to cooperate (principle of 
sincere cooperation, then Article 5 EEC) is also referred to.43 Moreover, the 
judgments in Von Colson and Marshall II refer to the other than compensatory, that 
is, deterrent, goals of damages liability.44 Van Gerven notes this – and the odd way of 
seeing damages in these cases as well as in the case of Dekker45 – but the significance 
of the full effectiveness-oriented reasoning may be emphasised as an addition to his 
analysis.46  
 
It is noteworthy that requirements that exceed those set by the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence partially take place in cases where the CJEU mixes 																																																								
39 Case C-271/91 Marshall II, para. 26 (the authentic language of the case is English); W. Van Gerven, 
37 CMLR 3, in particular p. 528 (2000). See also p. 530.	
40 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 82; W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 
528, 530 (2000).	
41 Ibid, p. 528–531.	
42 Ibid., see p. 531–535. See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 38–41 (2011). The 
authors discuss the ‘mildness’ of the original Rewe test. Note, furthermore, F. Della Negra, ‘The 
Uncertain Development of the Case Law on Consumer Protection in Mortgage Enforcement 
Proceedings: Sánchez Morcillo and Kušionová’, 52 CMLR, p. 1009–1032, at 1020–1024 (2015). 	
43 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, see, in particular, para. 20, 39, 72 and 
para. 4 of the summary.	
44 See Case 14/83 Von Colson, para. 28; Case C-271/91 Marshall II, para. 23–24, 26.	
45 Case C-177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I-03941, see para. 23 and 26.	
46 See W. Van Gerven, 37 CMLR 3, p. 530–535 (2000).	
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reasoning on sanctions and compensation for EU law infringements.47 This evidences 
the centrality of the full effectiveness of EU law in the reasoning and suggests that the 
ways of achieving full effect are not of primary importance. Hence, the ‘adequate 
judicial protection’ element appears to contain a remarkable component which is 
firmly tied to the principle of sincere cooperation48 and the duties it imposes on 
Member States.49 The centrality of full effect is illustrated further by, for example, 
Courage case law and phenomena similar to it – an issue that is discussed more 
elaborately in the next Section (III.C). 
 
C. CENTRAL FIELDS OF EU ECONOMIC AND INTERNAL MARKET 
LAW AND EXCEEDING THE CORE CONTENTS OF THE PRINCIPLES 
OF EFFECTIVENESS AND EQUIVALENCE? 
Among other economic integration-centred EU judgments, Courage case law has 
been pointed out as a line of judgments that shows powerful interventions by the 
CJEU in remedial and procedural matters.50 The relevant cases have included 
statements noting that the infringed competition Article (now 101(1) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) is ‘a fundamental provision which is 
essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in 
particular, for the functioning of the Internal Market’51 and also that, for instance, full 
effectiveness and the practical effect of the relevant substantive rule would be put at 
risk if it were not open to any individual to claim compensation.52 Even though the 
procedural autonomy dictum is in frequent use, a damages claim should be a remedy 
available for all willing claimants (apparently regardless of, for instance, the 																																																								
47 See Case 14/83 Von Colson, para. 21–28; Case C-271/91 Marshall II, para. 23–24, 26.	
48 See Case 14/83 Von Colson, in particular, para. 26–28; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie 
du Pêcheur, in particular, para. 39, 72 and para. 4 of the summary. See also Case C-271/91 Marshall II, 
para. 22–24, which, without explicit reference to loyal or sincere cooperation, employ similar language 
and refer to the judgment in Von Colson. As J. Temple Lang, 27 Fordham International Law Journal, 
p. 1905 (2003–2004), remarks, the principle of sincere cooperation may also be reflected in cases 
which lack particular references to it. See also Case C-177/88 Dekker, para. 23–26, which seem 
slightly ‘farther’ from sincere cooperation even though, for instance, the Von Colson judgment is 
referred to again. Dekker does not mention adequacy or commensurability as regards the relationship 
between compensation and harm but states that ‘any infringement – – suffices in itself to make the 
person guilty of it fully liable, and no regard may be had to the grounds of exemption envisaged by 
national law’ (para. 26).	
49 See also K. Havu, Oikeus kilpailuoikeudelliseen vahingonkorvaukseen EU:n ja Suomen oikeudessa, 
p. 254.	
50 Case C-453/99 Courage [2001] ECR I-06297 being the key judgment. As to the literature, see, for 
instance, P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, p. 222–231 (2011); M. 
Dougan, ’The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing Union Law 
before the National Courts’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Second 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 407–438, at 426–435. See also K. Havu, 
’Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law – The Changing Relationship of EU and National Law’, 
18 European Law Journal (ELJ) 3, p. 407–426, at 413–426 (2012).	
51 Case C-453/99 Courage, para. 20. 	
52 See Case C-453/99 Courage, para. 23–27; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR 
I-06619, for example, para. 60–61, see also para. 95–100; Case C-199/11 Otis [2012] electronic reports 
of cases, para. 40–43.	
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possibility of restitution or returning the contract price), and the scope of liability is 
extensive as even sufferers of very indirect harm are not, at least as a starting point, 
excluded, while loss of profit (lucrum cessans) as well as interest are explicitly 
included as types of damages.53  
 
Even before Courage, the CJEU had made similar remarks on the nature of the 
prohibition against competition-infringing contracts and, for instance, noted in Eco 
Swiss that the prohibition should be regarded as parallel to national public policy rules 
in the context of annulment of arbitration awards54 and then evaluated a related time-
limit issue as a procedural autonomy question.55 The fair competition case Muñoz 
shows full effectiveness-related similarities to Courage which should be noted even 
though Muñoz does not really contain procedural autonomy reasoning. However, the 
finding that an EU law rule must be enforceable in civil proceedings between private 
parties is most of all tied to the practical effect of the relevant substantive law, not, for 
instance, to the principle of effective judical protection.56 The Advocate General’s 
Opinion in Muñoz draws explicit parallels with Courage.57  
 
Effective application of competition provisions is very explicitly connected to the 
procedural autonomy dictum in Donau Chemie, by adding after the usual formula that 
‘(s)pecifically, in the area of competition law, those rules must not jeopardise the 
effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU’. The CJEU made strong 
statements on the unacceptability of a national rule, underlining the principle of 
effectiveness.58 Of other competition-related cases on national systems’ duty to ensure 																																																								
53 See Case C-453/99 Courage, para. 26–27; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 95–
100. In Courage, the procedural autonomy formula or parts of it are seen, for instance, in para. 29, in 
Manfredi, for instance, in para. 95, 100. In detail on the restrictions of procedural autonomy in 
Courage and Manfredi: K. Havu, 18 ELJ 3, p. 416–420 (2012). As regards the scope of liability, 
further proof of its significance, as well as of the exceptional nature when compared to treatment of 
many situations of pure economic loss, is Case C-557/12 Kone (not yet reported), where the issue is 
essentially whether the liability of competition infringers towards so-called umbrella customers 
(customers of infringers’ competitors) should be possible. See also N. Dunne, ‘It never rains but it 
pours? Liability for “umbrella effects” under EU competition law in Kone’, 51 CMLR 6, p. 1813–
1828 (2014).  	
54 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-03055, see para. 36–41.	
55 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss, see para. 43–48. See also P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases 
and Materials, p. 230–231 (2011), and p. 318 and 320 (2008); M. Dougan, National Remedies Before 
the Court of Justice , p. 48–49, 368–373. 	
56 See Case C-253/00 Muñoz [2002] ECR I-07289, para. 27–32. As regards comments, see, for 
instance, T. Eilmansberger, 41 CMLR 5, p. 1226–1228 (2004).	
57 See Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, in particular, para. 59–60, 3 and 53.  	
58 See Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie, para. 27 (with references to Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer [2011] 
ECR I-05161 and Case C-439/08 VEBIC [2010] ECR I-12471). In later paragraphs, the CJEU noted 
that ‘in so far as the national legal measure or rule – – allows the parties to the main proceedings 
having infringed Article 101 TFEU the possibility of preventing persons allegedly adversely affected 
by the infringement – – from having access to the documents in question, without taking account of the 
fact that that access may be the only opportunity those persons have to obtain the evidence needed – –, 
that rule is liable to make the exercise of the right to compensation – – excessively difficult’ (para. 39). 
The CJEU concluded that ‘European Union law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, precludes a 
provision of national law under which access to documents forming part of the file relating to national 
proceedings concerning the application of Article 101 TFEU, including access to documents made 
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EU rules take full effect, for instance, in CIF, the principle of sincere cooperation read 
together with substantive competition law led the CJEU to rule that a national 
competition authority was under the obligation to disapply national law which 
undermined EU competition law.59 However, CIF or similar cases on national law in 
contradiction with Member State duties and securing full effectiveness do not seem to 
employ procedural autonomy language.60  
 
In some other competition law public enforcement cases the procedural autonomy 
dictum or parts of it do appear. In VEBIC, the Court also explicitly referred to 
procedural autonomy, and mentioned effectiveness of EU competition law several 
times, while it ruled, narrowing the area of autonomy, that national competition 
authorities must be able to participate as a party in judicial proceedings that concern 
their own decisions.61 The case has been regarded as signifying remarkable 
intervention in procedural autonomy.62  
 
On the other hand, in Schenker63, which concerned bona fide as to complying with 
competition law and decisions that national competition authorities may take in case 
of negligent infringement of EU competition law, there is no clear procedural 
autonomy reasoning. However, the effectiveness of EU competition law is discussed 
again and the Court presents specific analysis on possible decisions by national 
authorities as well as on the exceptional nature of a decision finding competition law 
infringement but not imposing a fine.64 Both VEBIC and Schenker are Grand 
Chamber judgments and turn on interpretation of  specific rules on competition law 
enforcement, such as Regulation 1/2003.65 One can ask whether directing the 
guidance to national competition authorities in CIF and Schenker explains the absence 
of classic procedural autonomy language.66 
 
Uniplex concerned limitation periods and EU secondary law relating to public 
procurement. The CJEU emphasised ‘applying Community law fully’, set specific 
requirements as to the beginning of the time to initiate proceedings and noted that a 																																																																																																																																																														
available under a leniency programme, by third parties – – is made subject solely to the consent of all 
the parties to those proceedings, without leaving any possibility for the national courts of weighing up 
the interests involved’ (para. 49). 	
59 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) [2003] I-08055, see para. 46–52. As to 
comments, see J. Temple Lang, 27 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 1927–1928 (2003–2004).	
60 See also, for example, Case 229/83 Leclerc [1985] ECR 00001. 	
61 Case C-439/08 VEBIC, see, in particular, para. 58, 64 and the operative part.	
62 See, for example, F.  Rizzuto, ‘The procedural implications of VEBIC’, 32 European Competition 
Law Review 6, p. 285–296 (2011). In detail on VEBIC and for related discussion on requirements for 
judicial protection, see also P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 18 MJ 4, in particular, p. 521, 528–547 (2011).	
63 Case C-681/11 Schenker [2013], electronic reports.	
64 Ibid., see para. 36–50.	
65 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1, 1.	
66 See also, however, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-681/11 Schenker, para. 113–114, 
underlining the principle of effectiveness in the context of public enforcement of competition law. 
Achieving the goals of competition law seems more central than specific ways of requiring a 
contribution to doing so.	
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national court must also otherwise take into account that national law that is 
incompatible with relevant secondary law and does not lend itself to an interpretation 
which accords with EU law should be disapplied.67 The CJEU mentions the principle 
of effectiveness and its core contents but the role of the principle in the CJEU’s 
conclusions is not clear. The reasoning includes detailed comments on the 
unacceptability of a national rule.68 
 
As to free movement and related law, it should be noted that Brasserie du Pêcheur, 
which was discussed in Section III.B above (and will be discussed in Section III.D 
below), also related to free movement of goods.69 In Panayotova, the right of 
establishment and its restrictions in the form of rejections of residence permits were 
discussed. The CJEU found making the grant of a residence permit subject to specific 
conditions to be compatible with EU law but commented that treatment of residence 
permit issues must be based on a procedural system which is ‘easily accessible and 
capable of ensuring that the persons concerned will have their applications dealt with 
objectively and within a reasonable time, and refusals to grant a permit must be 
capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings’70 One can ask, 
for instance, whether ‘easily accessible’ equals ‘not practically impossible or 
excessively difficult’ or does it exceed the requirements set by the traditional 
principle of effectiveness. The principle of effective judicial protection plays a role in 
the reasoning but the CJEU seems to derive ‘easily accessible’ directly from 
procedural autonomy principles.71  
 
The highlighted cases of central economic law indeed include procedural autonomy 
reasoning with interventionist requirements or conclusions which cannot, regardless 
of their wording, actually be explained by the mere core content of the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence, which, prima facie, only set as limits for national 
solution the prohibitions against practical impossibility or excessive difficulty of 
relying on EU law and against less favourable treatment of an EU law-based claim 
when compared to a claim based on domestic law.  
 
However, Unibet, which was connected to freedom to provide services and which 
combined different effective judicial protection elements, the principle of effective 
judicial protection and the corresponding right occupying a central but possibly not 
exhaustive position, included noting that from the perspective of the twin princples 																																																								
67 Case C-406/08 Uniplex [2010] I-00817, see, in particular, para. 40–50, operative part. See also S. 
Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 39, 49 (2011): the authors note the case as a possible 
stringent application of effectiveness.	
68 Case C-406/08 Uniplex, see, para. 40–50, operative part.	
69 See, for example, para. 23 and 59.	
70 Case C-327/02 Panayotova, see para. 39 and the operative part. Emphasis added by this author. In 
addition to mentioning a procedural system, procedural autonomy reasoning is visible in para. 26–28.  
See also P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, p. 222–223 and 230–231 
(2011).	
71 See Case C-327/02 Panayotova, para. 26–27.  	
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(and other EU law), national remedies appeared sufficiently effective and acceptable. 
The national system allowed opportunities to challenge the compatibility of national 
law with EU law even though a separate action was not available.72 Grant of interim 
relief until the compatibility of national law with EU law was solved and the criteria 
for granting interim relief to suspend the application of the questioned provisions 
were discussed in the light of the mixture of EU law requiring effective judicial 
protection. The CJEU emphasised that interim relief must be possible if it is necessary 
to secure full effectiveness of a later judgment that concerns the existence and 
protection of EU law rights73 and that even though criteria for suspension of 
application of national provisions must be determined by the national system, the 
procedural autonomy twin principles (with their core content written out) must be 
observed.74 Regardless of a significant amount of discussion on effective judicial 
protection and limits of procedural autonomy, the conclusions of the CJEU do not 
appear extreme or interventionist. It is, however, deducible that the CJEU could see a 
self-standing action necessary in other national legal circumstances.75 
 
Regarding some other EU law matters (even though division into central Internal 
Market or economic law and other, ‘more peripheral EU law’76 is robust and not as 
informative or justified from the point of view of the whole of EU law as it might 
have been), cases can be pointed out where the ‘minimum contents’ of the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence seem to prevail and leave space for manoeuvre by 
national systems. This is in line with some earlier suggestions by scholars on the 
CJEU’s possible lesser intervention. In, for example, Fuß (protection of employees) 
this is the case at least partially, as the CJEU focuses on the minimum meaning of the 
twin principles.77 
 
However, there are also cases of a ‘more peripheral EU law’ and strong intervention 
in national remedial and procedural matters. In the employment law-related Impact, 
the CJEU combined different judicial protection elements of EU law, but the role of 
full effect reasoning as well as the procedural autonomy principles (their core content 
written out) is significant. The requirements set for the national system concerned a 
specialised court’s jurisdiction to hear a directive-based claim in addition to claims 
relating to transposing national law if presenting the EU law based claim in an 
ordinary national court would entail procedural disadvantages ‘liable to render 
excessively difficult the exercise’ of EU rights.78 																																																								
72 See Case C-432/05 Unibet, para. 37–65.	
73 See ibid., in particular, para. 77.	
74 See ibid., in particular, para. 82–83.	
75 See also M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, p. 130; S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 
REALaw 2, p. 41–42 (2011).	
76 Understood as law regarding issues with only indirect or minor links to economic integration or 
functioning of the Internal Market. As to problems of this kind of classification, see M. Dougan, 
National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, p. 83–84, 217–226, 386–390. 	
77 Case C-429/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I-12167 see para. 62, 95. See, however, 92, 98.	
78 Case C-268/06 Impact, see para. 40–55. See also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 
39, 49 (2011): the authors note the case as a possible stringent application of effectiveness.	
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Pontin dealt with EU secondary law relating to equal treatment of men and women 
and prohibition against dismissal during pregnancy and maternity leave as well as 
restrictions on remedies available for dismissed women. The CJEU recalled the twin 
principles and noted as to their meaning, interestingly, that a limitation period ‘does 
not appear to meet that condition, but that is a matter for the referring court to 
determine’.79 The judgment in Transportes Urbanos discussed the availability of 
Member State liability damages actions and applied the principle of equivalence (and 
not just gave guidance) as to evaluating the purpose and similarity of an EU law-
based and a domestic claim, stating that EU law precludes a rule on exhaustion of 
remedies before an EU law Member State liability claim is possible if this is not the 
case with ‘domestic State liability’.80 
 
In the context of secondary environmental legislation, rather far-reaching demands as 
to providing judicial review and possibly disapplying national law were made in 
Boxus.81 As Van Cleynenbreugel emphasises, procedural autonomy reasoning did not, 
however, have a prominent role in the case.82 In the social policy case Rosado 
Santana there was at least detailed discussion on applying the twin principles, in 
particular, the principle of effectiveness.83 In Sopropé, dealing with the principle of 
respect for the rights of the defence (and Community customs regarding products 
imported from third countries, for that matter), it seems that the CJEU was willing 
both to intervene and in a detailed way direct application of the principle of 
effectiveness.84  
 
In Mangold, reasoning similar to procedural autonomy reasoning plus referring to the 
obligation to ensure that EU rules take full effect, combined with the general principle 
of non-discrimination in respect of age, resulted in demands to set aside national 
																																																								
79 Case C-63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I-10467, see para. 59–69. The Court also mentioned that a rule 
which does not meet the requirements set by the twin principles would  ‘not be considered to meet the 
requirement of effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law‘ (para. 68).	
80 Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos [2010] ECR I-00635, see, in particular, para. 38–48. As to 
comments, see C. Plaza, ‘Member States Liability for Legislative Injustice, National Procedual 
Autonomy and the Principle of Equivalence: Going too far in Transportes Urbanos?’, 3 REALaw 2, p. 
27–51 (2010) (the author, eg, contests the correctness of finding similarity). See also S. Prechal and R. 
Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 39 and 49 (2011). The authors point out the case, as well as Pontin, as 
a possible stringent equivalence case.	
81 Joined Cases C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09 Boxus [2011] ECR I-09711.	
82 P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 5 REALaw 1, in particular, p. 98 (2012).	
83 Case C-177/10 Rosado Santana [2011] ECR I-07907, see para. 89–100.	
84 Case C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, see para. 43–54. See also S. Prechal, ‘Competence 
Creep and General Principles of Law’, 3 REALaw 1, p. 5–22, at 11–13 (2010). The author notes that 
dealing with general principles of EU law seems at points to be connected to strong demands for 
national systems. The author, who also discusses, among others, Case C-276/01 Steffensen [2003] ECR 
I-03735 (on evidence, fair hearing and foodstuffs, combining procedural autonomy reasoning with 
strong demands for observance of the right to a fair hearing and general principles of law, see para. 60–
80), states that general principles may bring about additional requirements which narrow down the 
principle of procedural autonomy.	
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legislation.85 In Kücükdeveci, the reasoning is practically entirely focused on the full 
effectiveness of EU law and national courts’ (sincere cooperation-based) obligations86 
– without signs of procedural autonomy reasoning.  
 
On the basis of this glance at potentially intriguing cases, a requirement that exceeds 
the core contents of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence seems to appear, 
even though sporadically, in the case law of the CJEU. Remarkably, the passages on 
requirements for national systems often suggest that tighter limits of acceptability of 
national law – or exact rules created by specifying interpretations of these tight limits 
– form procedural autonomy law or interpretations of the procedural autonomy 
principles. This continues to occur, moreover, in contemporary case law not studied 
above.87  
 
Nevertheless, listing the interesting aspects of a selection of cases is only a step 
towards discussion of ‘adequate judicial protection’ as an element and a potential 
extension of the traditional procedural autonomy principles. The applicability and 
significance of any of the procedural autonomy requirements is not extremely 
coherently illustrated or expressed by case law.88 Furthermore, even though some 
connection may be proposed between the CJEU’s focus on the full effect of law 
central to EU (economic) goals and ‘adequate judicial protection’, the listing as such 
is inconclusive. In addition to cases that emphasise full effectiveness of central 
Internal Market-related law, there are instances of strong intervention and additional 
requirements (within procedural autonomy reasoning) in the context of different legal 
fields or issues. Intervention in fundamental right-type matters and related remedies 
could well be one of the current tendencies, as well as emphasising the significance of 
EU law general principles. 
 
In the following analysis (III.D), a different thematic approach, focusing on the 
remedy of compensation, is adopted  as part of an attempt to observe the ‘adequate 
judicial protection’ requirement and its application. Also general, more analytic 
remarks (III.E−III.F) are presented on the basis of the case law highlights. 																																																								
85 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-09981, see, in particular, para. 76–78. See also S. Prechal, 3 
REALaw, 1, p. 19–22 (2010); C. Semmelmann, ‘General Principles in EU Law between a 
Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic Value’, 19 ELJ, 4, p. 457–487, at 476–483 (2013).	
86 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-00365, para. 45–53. See also S. Prechal, 3 REALaw, 1, p. 
17–19 (2010). On the links between the procedural autonomy principles, full effectiveness and the 
principle of sincere cooperation, see M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, p. 125–139; J. 
Temple Lang, 27 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 1905–1922, 1938 (2003–2004). See also M. 
Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution, p. 120–148 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).	
87 See remarks above in Sections III.B−III.C, and, for example, Case C-327/02 Panayotova, para. 26–
27; See also Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 95–100; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-
48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 67, 82–90. As to other recent case law, see also, for example, C-
565/11 Irimie [2013], electronic reports, para. 20–29; Case C-331/13 Nicula [2014] (not yet reported), 
para. 29–38.	
88 See also, for example, the discussion on competition law-related cases above. See also S. Prechal and 
R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 32–33 with references (2011).	
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D. CLOSER LOOK AT THE EXTENT OF COMPENSATION AND THE 
REQUIREMENTS SET BY EU LAW 
The first clear signs of the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement were, among 
other things, characterised by focus on sufficient compensation.89 The Marshall II 
judgment coupled the requirement of adequacy to requiring full, comprehensive 
compensation.90 Marshall II also included discussion on compensable harms and 
required an award of interest.91 Later, demands for full compensation or compensation 
for certain types of loss have several times been presented by the CJEU, most of all 
expressed as application of the principle of effectiveness. The relevant lines of 
reasoning have appeared both in earlier and later judgments, even though with 
varying directness, connected to the deterrent effects of damages liability.92 
 
In Brasserie du Pêcheur, the CJEU communicated a connection between the 
requirement of commensurate reparation and the prohibition against total exclusion of 
loss of profit from compensable harms and the procedural autonomy principles.93 It 
was expressly noted that ‘a total exclusion of loss of profit would be such as to make 
reparation of damage practically impossible’.94 Also a hint regarding the relevant 
matters involved in joined cases is made by noting that this is the case ‘(e)specially in 
the context of economic or commercial litigation’.95 Effective protection of EU law 
rights is one of the background elements for detailed discussion on the extent of 
reparation.96 Palmisani, Bonifaci and Maso all included references to adequate and 
commensurate reparation. The relationship between the two expressions remains 
obscure.97 
 
The extent of compensation and recoverable losses have remained central themes in 
CJEU interventions in national remedial matters. As suggested above (III.C), the 
remarkable nature of Courage case law is not only tied to the existence of private 
liability but to the extent and significance of liability. One evident background 																																																								
89 See, in particular, Case 14/83 Von Colson, para. 28.	
90 Case C-271/91 Marshall II, para. 26.	
91 Ibid., para. 30–32. 	
92 See also Sections III.B−III.C above.	
93 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 67, 82–90.	
94 Ibid., para 87. Emphasis added by this author.	
95 Ibid., para 87. See similarly later Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and 
Others [2001] ECR I-1727, para. 91; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 96 (with 
references to earlier judgments).	
96 See Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 82.	
97 See Case C–261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I–04025, para. 26, 34; Joined Cases C-94/95 and C-95/95 
Bonifaci [1997] ECR I–03969, para. 48, 53; Case C–373/95 Maso [1997] ECR I–04051, para 36, 41. 
M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, p. 258–259, notes the ambiguity and 
suggests that commensurability (often expressed as commensurability ‘with the loss or damage 
sustained’) could refer to full compensation whereas adequacy would signify a possibility to restrict the 
extent of reparation. These issues are intertwined with conceptions on relevant damage and on valuing 
different interests. See also note 107 below.	
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premise for the CJEU’s detailed requirements in this context is the establishment of 
primary EU law as a noteworthy regulator of horizontal relationships. Judgments 
discussing competition infringement-related damages have been explicit with the 
desired effect of damages liability as regards undertakings’ compliance with EU 
competition law.98  
 
For instance, in Manfredi the principle of effectiveness is an express starting point for 
requirements relating to the types of recoverable losses and the extent of 
compensation.99 There are, however, also matters the CJEU leaves to be governed by 
national solutions – this is illustrated, for example, by the treatment of exemplary or 
punitive damages in Manfredi. Also in this kind of context, general references are 
made to the principle of equivalence.100 
 
More recent Member State liability cases have also referred to commensurate 
reparation. Fuß even, to some extent, discusses the concept which nevertheless 
remains obscure. Determining the amount of reparation is to a great extent left for the 
national system under the twin principles.101 Adequacy of reparation has not been 
generally clarified by the CJEU. 
 
Arranging details of the extent of liability is also at the core of Kone where the 
Advocate General noted, for example, that ‘loss resulting from umbrella pricing is not 
loss the occurrence of which is always atypical or unforeseeable by the members of 
the cartel. It would be incompatible with the practical effectiveness’ of the current 
Article 101 TFEU ‘to preclude compensation for such loss from the outset’.102 The 																																																								
98 See also, however, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Manfredi, para. 69. Here, a view 
similar to demands for adequacy or commensurability in earlier judgments can be seen.	
99 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 95–100 (para. 95 stating ‘it follows from the 
principle of effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek compensation for loss caused by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition that injured persons must be able to seek 
compensation not only for actual loss – – but also for loss of profit – – plus interest.’).	
100 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 98– 99. See also Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-
48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 89–90. The relationship of the (procedural autonomy and twin 
principle-governed) concept of causality and the extent of reparation is, too, an issue. Here it cannot be 
explored fully, but one can ask whether leaving the causal connection to be determined in accordance 
with domestic criteria with plenty of space for manoeuvre undermines any statements on the extent of 
compensation. Also consider the significance of the Grand Chamber adopting the concept of direct 
causal link (used in some of the vertical liability cases) in the context of private competition liability in 
Case C-199/11 Otis, para. 65.	
101 Case C-429/09 Fuß, para. 92–98 (with references to Brasserie du Pêcheur and the relationship of 
the twin principles and commensurability seeming unclear). Conclusions are: ‘Consequently, – – the 
reparation, – – must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained. In the absence of relevant EU 
law provisions, it is for the national law of the Member State concerned to determine, while ensuring 
observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, first, whether reparation for the loss or 
damage suffered by a worker such as Mr Fuß in the main proceedings, as a result of the breach of a rule 
of EU law, should take the form of additional time off in lieu or financial compensation for the worker 
and, second, the rules concerning the method of calculation of that reparation’. See also, for example, 
Case C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-02749, para. 94 (no guidance as to determining 
commensurability and a reference to the twin principles).	
102 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-557/12 Kone, para. 52. Emphasis added by this 
author. See also para. 90.	
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CJEU reasoned in a similar way.103 In the Advocate General’s reasoning, the 
procedural autonomy twin principles, especially effectiveness, seem central even 
though their detailed role and relationship to, for example ‘full effectiveness’ and 
‘practical effectiveness’ are not clear.104 In the ruling, the procedural autonomy 
dictum is used and effective application and full effect of competition law are referred 
to but the detailed interrelations of different requirements remain open.105 
 
Regardless of apparent ties to the core contents of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence, links between the principles and guidance by the CJEU as to requiring 
full compensation or compensation for certain types of damage are not self-evident. 
The detailed requirements presented do not very logically follow from the core 
contents of the principle of effectiveness.106 Moreover, it can be noted that the ways 
in which pure economic loss should be treated according to the CJEU in the cases 
discussed may grant more and easier compensation than treatment according to purely 
domestic legal orders. Compensation other than ‘full’ could be completely in 
accordance with the core meaning of equivalence.107 
 
It is understandable that the explicit core contents of the principle of effectiveness 
require some kind of reasonability as to recoverable losses (for example, that national 
rules may not categorically result in finding that all the harms which relate to EU law 
infringements are other than recoverable) or even regarding amount of compensation 
(for example, that other than completely insignificant compensation is possible). 
From this area, however, there is still a distance to the detailed discussion the CJEU 
has presented.108 Nevertheless, it is rather clear that the ‘extended’ interpretation of, in 
particular, the principle of effectiveness is also capable of getting established as a part 
of (apparent) detailed interpretation of the procedural autonomy dictum. 
 
																																																								
103 See, in particular, para. 25–26, 33. Note similarities with Donau Chemie. As to reasoning in Kone, 
see also, for instance, N. Dunne, 51 CMLR 6, p. 1818–1823, 1825–1828 (2014).	
104 See, in particular, para. 22–52, 60–61, 74–75, 83, 90.	
105 See para. 25–26, 33–37. See also N. Dunne, 51 CMLR 6, p. 1818–1821, 1825–1826 (2014).	
106 See also K. Havu 150 JFT 1–2, p. 59–63 (2014); K. Havu, Oikeus kilpailuoikeudelliseen 
vahingonkorvaukseen EU:n ja Suomen oikeudessa, p. 252–257. 	
107 Varying perceptions of seriousness of pure economic loss and perceptions on what constitutes 
relevant damage may in any case give rise to versatile interpretation of the CJEU’s statements. By 
using the procedural autonomy dictum, judgments also refer back to national systems (for example, 
Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 82–89; Case C-429/09 Fuß, in 
particular, para. 92–95), which is contra-intuitive even more generally: ‘make sure compensation is 
commensurate but you may set the criteria for commensurability rather freely’. See also M. Dougan, 
National Remedies Before the Court of Justice, p. 258–260; K. Havu, ‘Quasi-coherence by 
Harmonisation of EU Competition Law-related Damages Actions?’, in P. Letto-Vanamo and J. Smits 
(eds.), Coherence and Fragmentation in European Private Law, p. 25–42, at p. 40 (Munich: Sellier, 
2012). 	
108 The early statements in Von Colson were, however, closer to the ideas presented now: see Case 
14/83 Von Colson, para. 28.	
		 22	
E. REMARKS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE ‘ADEQUATE JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION’ REQUIREMENT  
Many of the explicit ‘adequate judicial protection’ cases relate to compensation for 
EU law infringements. Nevertheless similar reasoning, that is often strongly rooted in 
the full effectiveness of EU law and that results in new and partially remarkable 
restrictions on procedural autonomy, is also found in other cases. Studying the strong 
demands imposing element of procedural autonomy law should not thus be restricted 
to explicit comments on adequacy of commensurability. It appears appropriate also to 
consider (other) conclusions seemingly made on the basis of the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence but which are not logical deductions from the wordings 
of those principles as instances of interesting significant demands.  
 
Moreover, the meaning of the twin principles is sometimes actually undermined by 
detailed discussion or application by the CJEU – this is also a way to extend the 
principles and allow strict interventions.109 In some of the cases, it is generally 
obscure what causes the detailed or significant requirements and whether they form 
procedural autonomy law or something else.110 It is evident that far-reaching 
requirements may also concern matters that are procedural or relating to the 
arrangement of the national procedure.111 The relevance of the ‘adequate judicial 
protection’ requirement – or any extra requirements – in new cases before national 
courts is ambiguous. Ambiguity appears to relate both to the issue whether tighter 
(actually twin principle-exceeding) limits of acceptability of national law apply and to 
the issue of what exactly the tighter limits are.112 Even the language referring to 
adequacy or commenssurability is not very exact.  
 
The way the CJEU, when imposing tighter limits on the acceptability of national law, 
may ‘extend’ or interpret normal procedural autonomy principles broadening their 
meaning is prone to create lack of clarity. The pointillist and almost misleading way 
in which different requirements for the national remedial and procedural system 
appear in case law inevitably results in a situation where it is difficult for national 																																																								
109 See, for example, Case C-63/08 Pontin; Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos; Joined Cases C-46/93 
and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur (para. 82–90, in particular, 87); Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 
Manfredi (para. 95) and discussion in Sections III.C and III.D.	
110 In addition to Sections III.C and III.D, see Prechal’s remarks discussed in note 84 above. In 
comparison, Case C-63/08 Pontin seems to use more general ‘requirement of effective judicial 
protection’ of EU rights as a final punch-line, after procedural autonomy reasoning which already 
suggests that national law is inacceptable (see para. 59, 67–68). 	
111 Of the cases mentioned in Section III.C, see for example, Case C-268/06 Impact, Case C-439/08 
VEBIC and Case C-327/02 Panayotova. See also Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und 
Beratungsgesellschaft [2010] ECR I-13849. The interventionism in this area has been recognised by, 
for example, P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Judge-made standards of national procedure in the post-Lisbon 
constitutional framework’, 37 European Law Review 1, p. 90–100, see, in particular, p. 92–94 (2012).	
112 See also P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 18 MJ 4, p. 538–539 (2011), who notes, justifiably, that the border 
between procedural autonomy law and ‘Simmenthal reasoning’ becomes increasingly blurry. As to the 
more general centrality of the full effect of EU law and the questionable existence of any procedural 
autonomy, see R. Barents, 51 CMLR, p. 1456 (2014).	
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courts to analyse their obligations, the correct level of adaptation of remedial and 
procedural details in order to guarantee effectiveness of EU law, and decide whether 
it is enough, for instance, that national law and its application does not render relying 
on EU law practically impossible or excessively difficult.113  
 
The existing case law interpreting in particular the principle of effectiveness – be it 
the core contents or the extended version of the principle – and creating more concrete 
limits or rules is prima facie helpful in situations very similar to those already 
decided. However, this is also uncertain as it is possible that, for example, the existing 
case was a situation of ‘normal application of the procedural autonomy twin 
principles’ and the case before a national court would be a situation where tighter 
limits (‘adequate judicial protection’) on national law should apply.  
 
Even though conclusions as regards possible variation of the requirements in different 
fields of EU law or recognizing fields with particularly strong requirements cannot be 
exhaustive on the basis of this study, and perhaps not in the current phase of law in 
any case, it is worth noting that the possibly highly instrumental element of ‘adequate 
judicial protection’ could play a crucial part in, for example, the context of private 
enforcement cases under EU competition law.114  Competition law enforcement could 
also more broadly be a matter where remedial and procedural requirements are 
particularly high. Paragraph 27 of Donau Chemie could actually be very close to an 
indirect explanation of what the twin principle-exceeding, seemingly procedural 
autonomy law demands are about. It also closes the circle back to much earlier 
remarks on the CJEU’s possible particular interests in commenting on remedies and 
procedure in areas that are essential for the Internal Market.115 One should, in any 
event, bear in mind that explicit links to the competition provisions do not exclude the 
possibility of developing similar reasoning in the context of free movement law – or 
any other EU law.116  
 
In several fields of substantive law, the extent of damages liability and ideas of 
deterrence (both in very early and very recent cases) have been instances of not 
logical but apparently procedural autonomy twin principles-derived requirements, as 
well as other detailed requirements. However, not all matters relating to extent and 
deterrence are encompassed,117 which results in insecurity as to possible conclusions 
from the case law. One obvious deduction is, however, that (and regardless of how the 																																																								
113 As to the ‘mildness’ of the Rewe-test (or its core contents) and the unpredictability of employing it, 
see also S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 4 REALaw 2, p. 38–41 (2011); P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 5 
REALaw 1, p. 88–90 (2012); F. Della Negra, 52 CMLR, p. 1020–1024 (2015).	
114 See Section III.D. See also earlier remarks K. Havu 150 JFT 1–2, p. 58–63 (2014); G. Cumming et 
al., Civil Procedure Used for Enforcement of EC Competition Law by the English, French and German 
Civil Courts, p. 280.	
115 See C-536/11 Donau Chemie, para. 27. As to remarks by scholars, see, for example, notes 13–14 
above.	
116 See also, in the context of justifying horizontal liability, K. Havu, 18 ELJ 3, p. 424–426 (2012).	
117 See Sections III.B and III.D as well as, in particular, the treatment of exemplary or punitive 
damages in Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, para. 98–99.	
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CJEU’s remarks on compensable losses and sufficient compensation are introduced 
by the Court itself or described by scholars) mere interpretation of the core contents 
of the twin princples without paying attention to cases with detailed guidance may 
result in a judgment which does not take EU law into account with sufficient 
intensity. 
 
F. REMARKS ON THE MEANING OF ‘ADEQUATE JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION’ OR EXTRA REQUIREMENTS AND OUTLOOK 
No general contents or meaning for the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement or 
element may be extrapolated on the basis of the cases reviewed. Furthermore, the 
tentatively recognised murkiness of focus, visible as vaguely highlighting the position 
of the individual while presenting arguments from the standpoint of the full effect of 
EU law, remains even in closer examination. The common denominator for cases 
where there are signs of exceeding the requirements set by the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence in the context of procedural autonomy reasoning is the 
exceeding itself, when compared to the core contents of the twin principles, but not, 
for instance, certain detailed requirements or a certain clear level of requirements.  
The CJEU’s way of using similar basic explanations as starting points for making 
interventions of different ‘intensity’ makes predicting future developments and 
acceptability of national solutions quite challenging.  
 
In more detail, it may be submitted that lack of clarity in terms of the meaning of 
‘adequate judicial protection’ is two-fold: first, scarce and ambiguous instances of 
application in the case law do not give rise to simple conclusions, and, secondly, the 
content or meaning of the requirement is casuistic by nature. Guaranteeing effective, 
sufficient application of EU law, and for example commensurable redress as an 
element of such application, in a specific legal and factual context, also underpins the 
difference of the requirement when compared to the ‘traditional’ procedural 
autonomy twin principles and their explicit, negative and as such not especially 
flexible explanations. 
 
Full effectiveness, the principle of sincere cooperation and thus Member State 
obligations to contribute to achieving the goals of EU law are in any event relevant 
perspectives to the meaning of the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement (or any 
extra requirements). They are important in addition to the potential, more particular or 
situation-specific guidance relevant for a specific case. Especially in the context of the 
central Internal Market or economic law, the connection to effective application and 
full effect, and to duties under 4(3) TEU, is already central on the basis of the cases 
reviewed. The connection signifies that even though no clear contents for so-called 
‘adequate judicial protection’ could be determined, it is to some extent possible to 
understand and predict how the possibly casuistic meaning of the requirement 
crystallizes. 
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Nevertheless, even recognising the effective application of substantive EU law as an 
indicator of acceptable ways to decide a case before a national court, contributing to 
the full effect of EU law and the decision which most contributes are still, depending 
on the case involved, potentially demands of different intensity, the last mentioned 
being the one that leaves the least space for national manoeuvre.118 Absence of clarity 
as to evaluation of acceptability of national remedial and procedural law is 
accentuated by the fact that the CJEU reviews a minority of potentially relevant cases 
– only those where preliminary ruling requests are submitted. 
 
The express tying of procedural autonomy reasoning to effective application of a 
substantive field of law, as was done, for instance, in Donau Chemie,119 serves as an 
example of the direction the reasoning by the CJEU could take in future judgments. 
This direction could also include elaborating on the relationship between classic 
procedural autonomy dicta and remarks in their vicinity. Also matters relating to 
deductions on the basis of the classic dictum and core contents of the twin principles 
and conclusions based on other demands for the national system could be 
illuminated.120 
 
Where an express connection is made to a field of law and effective application, the 
specific substance of rules may allow more detailed analysis of the necessary 
measures in a case before a national court. Obligation to contribute to achieving the 
goals of EU law then underpins the possible options  – even though it may still remain 
open whether only the treatment which most contributes to achieving the goals is 
acceptable. In this context, the above mentioned risk of misguided ‘over-compliance’ 
is also relevant. Requests for preliminary rulings should thus be readily made by 
national courts.121 
 
																																																								
118 The ‘required level of full effectiveness’ is ambiguous, for instance, in Case C-536/11 Donau 
Chemie (para. 27, 49) and in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur (para. 82, 90). 
However, ‘the Simmenthal line’ seems to require ‘the fullest effect’: see Case 106/77 Simmenthal 
[1978] ECR 00629 and, for example, Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten.	
119 Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie, para. 27.	
120 Compare to Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie, para. 27–49 where the principle of effectiveness is 
apparently central but where the issue of ‘which effectiveness’ (see R. Nazzini, ‘Potency and Act of the 
Principle of Effectiveness: The Development of Competition Law Remedies and Procedures in 
Community Law’, in C. Barnard and O. Odudu, (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law, p. 
401–435 (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009)) may also be relevant. From the perspective of 
procedural autonomy effectiveness, the Court’s analysis may be implicitly tilted towards requiring that 
the national system should allow easily obtaining compensation, which is different from having a 
possibility to present claims on the basis of EU law. Thus the CJEU’s approach, especially if 
elaborated further, at some point potentially departs from the core of procedural autonomy 
effectiveness. Note also recent remarks on possible ‘social-oriented’ effectiveness and on effectiveness 
in consumer cases: F. Della Negra, 52 CMLR, p. 1020–1024 (2015). 	
121 However, ambiguities relating to EU law on judicial protection in national courts also have the 
potential effect that a national court does not recognize that the state of EU law requires clarification.	
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This article has discussed the nuances of the limits of acceptability for national 
remedial and procedural solutions in cases with a EU law aspect. The contribution 
elaborated on the ‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement as an expression and 
potential extension of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Analysis 
illustrated how CJEU case law on treatment of cases before national courts may be 
enigmatic and even illogical. This complicates the task of correctly applying EU law. 
Furthermore, parties to disputes face significant uncertainty as to the likely treatment 
of their case. As an attempt to improve the situation, some precise suggestions may be 
presented as a continuation to remarks in previous Sections. 
 
In addition to the need for clarification of the whole of EU law on judicial protection 
in the Member States, the narrower field of procedural autonomy law would benefit 
from more detailed reasoning by the CJEU. If the twin principles are expanding in 
meaning, creating tighter limits on national systems, the apparent focus on their 
‘minimum contents wordings’ should be re-thought. Additionally, when presenting 
requirements that are necessary in order to guarantee effective application of the 
substantive law in question, these requirements should not be apparently derived from 
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence when they actually form demands that 
may be described as additional to the established twin principles. When requirements 
are characteristic of a particular field or matter of EU law, stating this clearly, as has 
at points happened, is in order. Maybe relying on rough concepts – such as the 
‘adequate judicial protection’ requirement – that try to collect the manifold 
expansions of demands for national systems can be made unnecessary. 
